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THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT AND ITS
IMPACT ON OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM
AZRA B. ZAIDI
Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a
little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.
- Benjamin Franklin
Nothing could be less American than a government that can
indefinitely hold people in secret torture cells, take away
their protections against horrific and cruel abuse, put them
on trial based on evidence they cannot see, sentence them
to death based on testimony literally beaten out of witnesses, and then slam shut the courthouse door for any
habeas corpus petition. But that's exactly what Congress
just approved.
- Christopher Anders, legislative counsel
for the American Civil Liberties Union

INTRODUCTION: THE PASSAGE OF THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT
I.

Background
A. The Deterioration of Procedural Safeguards Post
9/11
B. Reviewing Hamden v. Rumsfeld
C. Applicability of the Geneva Convention
The Military Commissions Act (MCA)
II.
A. Scope, Provisions, Applicability
B. The Suspension of Habeas
C. Challenging MCA
Conclusion
III.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York
and Washington, D.C. redefined our criminal justice system,
prompting the courts to search for a delicate balance between civil
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liberties and law enforcement. Just a week after the attacks, in an
atmosphere of tremendous fear and anxiety, Congress passed a
Joint Resolution authorizing the President to use force against
those responsible for the attacks. Forty-five days later the USA
PATRIOT Act' was passed, modifying long-standing principles in
the area of search and seizure. After the U.S. Military operations in
Afghanistan, prisoners were captured and detained at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, raising concerns about the lack of due process afforded
to them. As a result, trials for such "unlawful combatants, 2 were to
be held by military tribunals operating under redefined rules of
criminal procedure. Although the Supreme Court in Hamden v.
Rumsfeldpheld such tribunals illegal, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) 4 on October 17, 2006, upholding the
validity of the trials. The Act was signed into law by President
Bush, reinstating the military tribunals and eroding years of
procedural safeguards within our justice system.
This paper will explore the legality of the provisions of the
MCA in light of the Hamden decision as well as within the
constitutional framework. In Part I of this paper I will outline the
events that led up to the passage of the MCA: the expansion of the
power of the President, the debate over the qualification of an
"alien, unlawful combatant" and the controversy over prisoners
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In Part II I will discuss and
analyze the Hamden v. Rumsfeld decision. In light of this background, in Part III, I will review some of the provisions of the
MCA, analyze their constitutionality and predict their effects. Part
IV will describe how the MCA violates international law and its
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
2 "Enemy

combatant" is a general category that contains two sub-categories:
lawful and unlawful combatants. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942).
Lawful combatants receive prisoner of war status as well as the protections of
the Third Geneva Convention while unlawful combatants receive neither.
President Bush has determined Al Qaida members to be unlawful combatants,
See infra Part II.A.
3 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
4 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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requirements for the treatment of "alien, unlawful combatants"
under the Geneva Conventions. Finally, Part V will focus on cases
pending in-Courts challenging the provisions of the MCA and how
the courts should rule on them if our country is to remain a
democracy.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. The Deterioration of Procedural Safeguards
Post 9/11

Less than a week after the events of September 11, 2001,
Congress passed a joint resolution known as the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizing the president to
"use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
the United
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
5
persons."
or
organizations
nations,
such
by
States
Some 45 days after 9/11, Congress passed the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. 6 The
Act dramatically expanded the government's powers to investigate
certain types of offenses, making it easier to gather intelligence,
conduct electronic surveillance, and to search, detain, and arrest
suspects with little, if any, judicial oversight.7 Congress defended
the broad reach of the Act on the premise that the constitutional
restraints imposed on law enforcements should not apply when the
government is fighting foreign threats or terrorism.8 The Act
eroded further procedural safeguards by adopting a broad defi5 Authorization

(2001).
6 USA

for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224

PATRIOT Act, supra note I.

7 Id. at § 201-225.
8 Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1811, 1821-

29, 1841-46, and 1861-62 (1978).
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nition of "terrorism," thereby expanding the potential targets, and
permitting surveillance as long as foreign intelligence gathering
has a "significant purpose." 9 Permissible interception allows the
government to subpoena records from banks, financial institutions,
and Internet service providers, while sidestepping the need to show
probable cause or even reasonable grounds that the person whose
records it seeks is engaged in criminal activity.' 0 The act further
allowed the government to conduct warrantless wiretaps and
searches as well as carry out electronic eavesdropping of entirely
domestic activity under looser standards than are provided for
ordinary criminal surveillance."
Although the purpose of the relaxed requirements is to
effectively investigate and thwart national security threats, the
evidence obtained through these efforts may nonetheless
be
12
admitted in non-terrorist related criminal prosecutions.
The secret, indefinite detention and mistreatment of terror
suspects by the CIA has also been a by-product of the war on terror
along with the CIA's use of secret prisons in other countries. 3 The
agency set up these prisons under its covert action authority.
"Under U.S. law, only the president can authorize a covert action,
by signing a document called a presidential finding. Findings must
not break U.S. law and are reviewed and approved by CIA, Justice
Department and White House legal advisers."' 4 The authorization
granted by the President after 9/11 gave the CIA broad authority to
"disrupt terrorist activity, including permission to kill, capture and
detain members of al Qaeda anywhere in the world."' 15 Faced with
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, supra note I at § 218.
1 Id
id. at § 103, 104, 122.
See In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (2002).
13 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, Nov.
12

2, 2005, at Al (describing covert prison system in which CIA interrogators use
techniques prohibited by both U.N. conventions and U.S. military law).
14 Id.
15Id. See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, Newsweek, May 24, 2004, at
31 (President Bush expressly authorized the CIA to set up secret detention
facilities outside of the United States and to use harsh interrogation techniques).;
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allegations of tortured detainees,' 6 the Bush Administration has
been firm in its claim that no law (domestic or international) limits
the activities of the CIA abroad.
Another post-9/11 aftermath has been the government's
detention of both citizens and non-citizens to be held without
access to counsel, or specific charges, or the ability to challenge
their sentences.1 7 In an effort to try these "enemy combatants," on
November 13, 2001, President Bush authored an Executive Military Order, titled the "Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," by virtue of his role
as the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces and
the AUMF. 18 The order defined which individuals would be considered "international terrorists" and specified that those individuals would be tried by military commissions with no right of
judicial review.1 9 Without much in the way of proof or persuasion,
the President made a finding that non-U.S. citizen individuals who
were past or present members of Al-Qaida, or who had provided
any type of material, financial or other form of assistance to members of Al-Qaida at any time should be considered "individuals
subject to this order." 20 Accordingly, so long as there is "reason to
believe" a person satisfies the preconditions to be considered "an
individual subject to this order," all efforts must be made to place
the individual into the custody of the Department of Defense so
and tried in accordance with the prothat he or she can be2detained
1
Order.
the
of
visions

David Rennie, Inquiry into CIA's "Secret European Jails," Daily Telegraph

(London), Nov. 4, 2005, at 16 ("[T]he Czech Republic, which joined the EU last
year, said that it had recently refused a request from American officials to set up
a detention centre.")
16 Douglas Jehl, Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics in Interrogation,N.Y.
Times,
Nov. 9, 2005, at Al.
17 See Presidential Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (2001).
18Id.
19Id. at §§ I(a) and 2(b).
20 Id. at § 2(a)(1).
21 Id. at §§ 2(b)-(c).
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The Executive Military Order stripped away procedural
rules and safeguards from the accused, including the right to
appeal and right to a trial by a jury, in the name of protecting the
United States from terrorists and future attacks. The President
reasoned that in light of the "danger to the safety of the United
States and the nature of international terrorism," and in order "to
protect the United States and its citizens," the military commissions cannot effectively operate under the traditional rules of
evidence and procedure followed in the "trial of criminal cases in
the United States District Courts. 22
Subsequently, the military commissions established by the
Order, provided that the panel of judges would sit as both the trier
of law and fact, headed by a presiding military officer endowed
with the power to admit any and all evidence against the defendant
23
so long as it has some "probative value to a reasonable person.
The military panel was also granted the power to convict the
defendant based on a two-thirds majority vote. 24 Consequently, the
defendant was denied of all rights to appeal his conviction, along
with all other aspects of his case to "any court of the United States
or any State thereof, any court of any foreign nation or any
international tribunal. 25 In fact, the only oversight afforded to the
defendant was a review
conducted "by [the President] or by the
26
Secretary of Defense.,

The Order violated the basic principles of the U.S.
constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights which provides that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." 27 Because the clause addresses "persons" and not
just citizens, due process rights are established for all individuals
within the jurisdiction of the United States, regardless of their
status. Nonetheless, the 5 th Amendment allows for a different set of
Presidential Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 at §§ I(e)-(f) (2001).
23 Id. at §§ 4(c)(2)-(3).
24 Id. at § 4(c)(6)
25 Id. at §§ 7(b)(2)(i)-(iii).
26 Id. at §§ 7(b) and 4(c)(8).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22
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standards in due process rights in "cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger." 28 Because of this exception, Congress has
allowed for the establishment of alternative due process forums to
be conducted in times of war or military conflict.
Further, it has been argued that the President's detention of
enemy combatants is derivatively permitted by the Constitutional
vestment of power in him as "Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States. '29 Detention of enemy combatants
is seen as necessary to the "war" effort to both ensure those captured individuals do not return to the aid of the enemy and to
supply our Armed Forces with additional resources for information
related to the conflict. 30 However, the line is typically drawn at the
Presidential authority to detain, thereby preventing the President
from using this same power to adjudicate criminal and war-related
charges against detainees. President Bush in his establishment of
the tribunals "has moved outside the perimeter of his role as
Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces and entered a zone that
involves judging and punishing alleged violations of the laws;
assessing guilt and meting out retrospective justice rather than
waging war." 31
For these reasons, on June 29, 2006, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of military commissions
created by the President pursuant to the power given to him by the
AUMF and the Constitution in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.32 In its
extensive review of the history, form and function of the special
military commissions, and after first determining it had jurisdiction
to hear the case, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
Court of Appeals and ruled in favor of Hamdan. The Supreme
Court determined that President Bush did not have authority to
28 Id.
29 U.S. CONST. art.
30

11.

Norman Abrams,

ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

198-199

(Thomson/West 2005 2d ed. 2005).
31 Id. at 399 (citing Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1269-1270 (2002)).
32 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
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create the special military commissions established to try detainees
including Hamdan, and that the military commissions were illegal,
violating both the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ).
B. Reviewing Hamden
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen and former driver
for Osama bin Ladin, was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and
detained by the United States at Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba
in 2002.33 It was one year after his initial detention that President
Bush declared Hamdan eligible for trial and another year before he
was finally charged with conspiracy for having "conspired and
agreed with Osama bin Laden . . . and other members and
associates of the al Qaida organization to commit . . . offenses

triable by military commission[, including among other things,]
terrorism." 34 The charging document accused Hamdan of engaging
in an "enterprise of conspiracy" when he acted as the personal
driver and bodyguard to Osama bin Laden, transporting weapons
on behalf of al Qaida, accompanying Bin Laden to "training
camps, press conferences, or lectures," where Bin Laden "would
encourage others to conduct 'martyr missions' against ...
Ameri-

cans, to engage in war against the Americans, and to drive the
'infidels' out of the Arabian Peninsula," in addition to receiving
training to use "rifles, handguns and machine
guns at the al Qaida' 35
sponsored al Farouq camp in Afghanistan."
In response to the charges brought against him, Hamdan
filed "petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus to challenge the Executive Branch's intended means of prosecuting this
charge." 36 Specifically, Hamdan was concerned that the Commission the President established to try him lacked authority on the
grounds that: (1) conspiracy was not an offense that could be tried
"3Id. at 2759.

Charging Documents, U.S. v. Hamdan, 2, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
JuI2004/d2OO4O714hcc.pdf (last visited Jun. 22, 2007).
35
d.at 2-3.
36 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2759.
34
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as a "violation of the law of war," and (2) the procedures adopted
by the President violated both military and international law.37 The
District Court agreed with Hamdan and granted relief as
requested.38 The government appealed the District Court's ruling.
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, holding
that the military commission put in place to try Hamdan and other
detainees were, in fact, legal and created by the President through a
legitimate utilization of power. 39 This time, Hamdan appealed the
the Court granted certiorari
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court;
40
and heard arguments on both sides.
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court held that the
government could not take any action it wanted in the name of the
war on terrorism and struck down the military commissions
created by the President by executive order.4 1 Justice Stevens'
majority opinion clarified that the Court was unwilling to read the
AUMF as a blank check for the President's actions.42 The Court
clarified that although the President is allowed to establish special
military commissions, he must do so under the direction of laws
21 of
which have been codified into the laws of war under Article 43
the Uniform Code of Military Justice or authorized by statute.
The Supreme Court cited that the best precedent for the
purposes of examining this type of commission is the decision in
Ex parte Quirin.44 There, the Supreme Court ruled that there are
four preconditions that must come to fruition before a tribunal can
be deemed legal. 45 First, the commission may only maintain jurisdiction over those offenses committed "within the field of command of the convening commander., 46 Second, the offense must
37

id.

38 Id. (citing Ham dan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.C. 2004)).

39 Id. (citing Ham dan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (2005)).
40 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759-760.
41id.
42

id.

43Id. at 2773-774.

44 Id. at 2777, citing Ex Parte Quirin 63 S.Ct. 1 (1942).
45 Id.(quoting W. Winthrop, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831, 836 (rev. 2d

ed. 1920) (hereinafter Winthrop).
46 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2777 (quoting Winthrop at 836).
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have been committed during the time of war.47 Third, only the
individuals who are members of the enemy's armed forces that
have engaged in "illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation
of the laws of war" can be tried.48 And, fourth, the commission
may only try those offenses that are either violations of the laws of
war, or "breaches of military orders or regulations., 49 Applying
this rule to the case at hand, it was clear that Hamdan failed to
meet the criteria outlined because the charges on Hamden were not
committed under the threat or at the time of war. His alleged
unlawful actions were all committed before September 11, 2001,
the starting point for the war. Furthermore because "conspiracy" is
not a universally recognized violation of the laws of war, because
it does not imply "completion of an offense," it therefore cannot be
considered a "hostile and warlike act" and thus insufficient
to be
50
tried as "a stand-alone offense against the law of war."
The Court in its analysis went on to hold that even if
Hamdan was eligible to be tried by a special military commission,
the trial could not proceed because the commissions do not comply
with the standards set for the by the UCMJ, American common
law of war, and international law, including the "four Geneva
Conventions signed in 1949."'" While the defendants are afforded
the right to counsel, a written statement of all charges against them
and a presumption of innocence, the defendants and defendants'
counsel may be precluded from viewing evidence during the proceeding that the government decides to withhold and the defendant's attorney may be forbidden from discussing certain evidence
with the defendant. 52 Evidence judged to have any probative value
to be admitted, including hearsay, unsworn live testimony, and
statements gathered through torture may be allowed and appeals
could not be heard by the courts.53 The court held such a deviation
47 Id. (quoting Winthrop at 837).
48

Id.(quoting Winthrop at 838).

49

id.

'oHamdan,

126 S. Ct. at 2779, 2782-83.

"' Id. at 2786.
52

13

id.
Id. at 2786-787.
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in procedure to be "uncharacteristic in our limited history of military commissions in the United States where the norm is usually to
create a commission that operates with a procedural structure
parallel to that used in traditional courts martial. 54 Therefore, the
Court concluded that because the special military commissions
established by the President do not mimic the procedural structure
and form of courts-martial and deviate far more than is necessary
under the uniformity principal, the commissions do not therefore
comply with American statutory and common law related to the
trial of war crimes.
The government tried to argue that there was statutory
authority for the military commissions as provided for in the
presidential executive order, especially under AUMF, adopted
after September 11. 55 The government also claimed that the
56
Detainee Treatment Act authorized the military commissions.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and declared, "there
is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even
hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization
set forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ.

''57

The Court also stated that it

did not need to consider whether the President may constitutionally
convene military commissions "without the sanction of Congress.",58 The Court said that it "has not answered [the question]
definitively, and need not answer today." 59 Therefore the Court left
open the possibility that the commissions may be operative under
direct authorization from Congress.
C. Applicability of the Geneva Convention
Common Article Three of the Conventions provides that
individuals, "including members of the armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed by detention, or any other cause,
14

Id. at 2788.

" Hamdan at
56 id.

57

Id. at 2775.

58 Id.
59 Id.

2774.
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shall in all circumstances be treated humanely." 60 It further states
that in order to ensure humane treatment of these individuals,
certain acts against them shall be prohibited including, "the passing
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
judicial guarantees6 1 which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples."
The issue in question is under what circumstances may the
Geneva Conventions may be invoked, as well as to whether they
may be raised by detained individuals. The Supreme Court
answered this affirmatively and states that the Geneva Conventions
are "part of the [undisputed] law of war," and are therefore
62
applicable.

Accordingly the Court details the violations of the Convention by the established military commissions. The Court of Appeals had agreed with the government that the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable because they not only precluded a right to
individual invocation, but were also inapplicable because the
Geneva Conventions only apply to states that are signatories to the
Conventions, of which al Qaida is not one, thereby precluding the
protection of Hamdan who was captured pursuant to the conflict
with al Qaida.63 However, in overturning the Court of Appeals
decision, the Supreme Court found that even if al Qaida was not a
signatory to the Geneva Conventions, every individual is still
afforded, at the very least, minimal protections under the treaty as
long as they are involved in a conflict in the territory of a signatory. 64 Because Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan, and because
Afghanistan is a signatory to the Conventions, he is entitled to at
least minimal protection guarantees under them.
Therefore, in order to comply with the Conventions, Hamdan must be tried "by a 'regularly constituted court"' that is most
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article I1].
61 Id.
62 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2794.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 2796.
60
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easily manifested as either a court-martial or civilian court. 6 ' However the Court fell short of overruling the President's authority to
create military tribunals. Instead the President had two options:
operate the commissions by the rules of regular military courtsmartial, or ask Congress for specific permission to proceed
differently.
II.

THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT
A. The Scope and Provisions of the Act

On October 17, 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act66 as a response to the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Supreme
Court decision. The broad and unclear provisions of the Act allow
for the establishment of the military commissions under which
almost anyone can be tried.
The beginning section of the Act lays out the purpose as:
"[to establish] procedures governing the use of military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities
against the United States for violations of the law of war and other
offenses triable by military commission.67 The confusion arises
from the term "unlawful enemy combatant" which is defined
broadly to include anyone "who has engaged in hostilities or who
has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its co-belligerents," and who is not a lawful
combatant. 68 Such a definition could support the use of this Act
against U.S. citizens. Worse still is the extent of the umbrella under
which people may be classified as "unlawful enemy combatants."
Under International Humanitarian Law, which regulates the laws
of war, a distinction exists between those who may be considered

Common Article III, supra note 59, at Part I, art. 3.
Military Commissions Act, supra note 4.
67 Id. at §948b (a).
68 Id. at §948a (1)(i).
65

66
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combatants and those who are to be treated as civilians. 69 While
combatants directly participate in hostilities, people who merely
support hostilities, such as cooks at a military site, are considered
civilians and thus cannot be deliberately targeted for attack or
capture. 70 However the MCA fails to acknowledge the distinction
and qualifies everyone under an unjustifiably broad term. For
example,
Bobby's parents ran a bodega in Brooklyn. They sometimes handled money transfers for members of the Middle
Eastern community there. It so happened that Lebanese
immigrants had used the bodega to send money back to
West Beqaa, an area within the Hezbollah protectorate.
Because Bobby's father knew what part of the world the
money was going to, the feds concluded he had 'purposefully and materially supported hostilities.' And that was
enough: He could be detained indefinitely under the
MCA. 7'
The second prong of the Act delegates to the President or
Secretary of Defense unrestricted power to deem anyone an unlawful enemy combatant. 72 All it requires is that a "competent tribunal" like a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) make the
determination. 73 The Act however fails to define the substance of
See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War [hereinafter CCW Protocol V], available in Procedural Report of the Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the CCW, CCW/GGE/VI/2, December 11,
2003, Annex II, Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, pp. 10-21; Protocol I;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of August 12, 1949. These treaties apply primarily to international conflicts. Geneva Conventions, Common Art. 2; Protocol 1, Art. 1(3).
70 Aziz Huq, Terror 2016, TOM PAINE, September 29, 2006, http://www.
tompaine.com/articles/2006/09/29/terror_2016.php (last visited Jun. 22, 2007).
71 id
72 Military Commissions Act, supra note 4,
at §948a (l)(ii).
73 Id. CSRTs are the administrative boards that review detentions at
Guantanamo.
69
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the criteria that the tribunal should apply, indicating that the tribunal has open authority to do as it pleases. The provision is an
unconstitutional delegation of unchecked power.
The commissions themselves consist of at least five commissioned military officers. In cases in which death is a possible
74
penalty, the commissions must include at least twelve officers.
The imposition of the death penalty requires a unanimous vote.75
However such overarching authority of the commission to hand
down death sentences violates international standards which permit
capital punishment only after trials affording "all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial. 76 Conveniently, the MCA eliminates
as a war crime the passing of sentences by a court that does not
meet international fair trial standards.
77
The commissions are presided over by a military judge.
Military judges to sit on the commissions are assigned by the
Secretary of Defense instead of by a neutral third authority. 78 The
concern is that due to the government's interest in the outcome of
the trials and its role in the appointment of judges, the impartiality,
independence, and competence of the tribunal become severely
compromised.
The next section of the MCA defines the right for the
accused to be represented by counsel. 79 However, civilian counsel
must be a U.S. citizen and be eligible for access to classified
74 Id. at
75 id.
76

§949m (c)(2)

Economic and Social Council resolution 1984/50 of 25 May 1984 Safeguards

Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcomp41.htm (last visited
Jun. 22, 2007), outlines standards for the application of capital punishment. The
document does not call for the abolition of the death penalty, but establishes
nine safeguards. The safeguards include the right to due process, appeal, and
imposition of capital punishment only after final judgment by a "competent
court after legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair
trial." The safeguards recommend a prohibition on the imposition of the death
penalty on persons who committed a crime before the age of 18, pregnant
women, and the insane.
77 Military Commissions Act, supra note 4, at §948j (a).
78 id.
79

Id. at §948k

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXV

information deemed secret. 0 This means that the right for charged
detainees to be represented by a counsel of their choosing is
limited to those whom the government has deemed eligible. The
apparent ambiguity is: how does one recognize which attorneys are
classified as "eligible" and which are not and what is the basis for
making that judgment.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Defense to prescribe
procedures and rules of evidence beyond those that are set out in
the bill. 8' Such procedures and rules can vary from their courtsmartial equivalents as long as the Secretary finds that it is impracticable to abide by courts-martial standards.8 2 Evidence judged to
have any probative value may be admitted, including hearsay,
unsworn live testimony, evidence gathered in violation of a search
warrant, and statements gathered through coercion. 83 While statements obtained under torture are inadmissible as evidence, statements obtained under coercion (including cruel treatment) are
admissible under certain circumstances. 84 This allows for introduction of evidence that has been extracted under cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment or as a result of "outrages upon
personal dignity, particularly humiliating or degrading
treatment",
85
all which are violations of the Geneva Convention.
The bill includes a number of provisions that protect classified "sources, methods, or activities" against being revealed but
permits their use as evidence against the defendant. 86 The bill specifies, for example, that during the discovery phase, the judge may
protect classified "sources, methods, or activities" from disclosure.
Therefore the defendant does not have the right to challenge the
"sources methods or activities" by which the government acquired
the evidence.8 7 This is of particular concern in light of the high
80

Id. at §949c(b)(3)(D).
§949a (a).

81 Id. at
82
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Military Commissions Act, supra note 4, at §949a(a).
Id. at §949a(b)(2)(A-E).
id. at §949a(b)(2)(C).
Common Article 111,supra note 59, at Part I, art. 3.
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level of secrecy and resort to national security arguments employed by the administration in the "war against terror," which
have been widely criticized by the UN Committee against Torture
and the Human Rights Committee. Furthermore, the immunity of
"classification" may give rise to circumstances in which the
government may claim secrecy simply to avoid scrutiny of
evidence obtained from torture or through other means of human
rights violations. A defendant cannot put on a viable defense if
they are not told whom the allegations against them were obtained
from, where and in what manner. Such a provision ensures a lack
of inquiry into the CIA's abusive interrogation practices.
The MCA states that it does not create any new crimes, but
simply codifies offenses "that have traditionally been triable by
military commissions." 88 It names and defines twenty-eight specific crimes that are triable by military commission, including
murder of protected persons, murder in violation of the bill of war,
hostage-taking, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, mutilation or
maiming, rape, sexual abuse or assault, hijacking, terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, and spying. 89 This provision is
meant to convince the courts that there are no ex post facto problems with the offenses that the bill lists.
The law also nullifies the legal impact of the Conventions
in domestic courts. Section 5 of the law provides that the Geneva
Conventions and related treaties are unenforceable in court in civil
cases involving the U.S. government or its agents. 90 It states,
specifically, that they may not be invoked "in any habeas corpus or
any other civil action or proceeding ... as a source of rights in any

[U.S. or state] court." 9' It furthermore bars persons deemed unlawful enemy combatants from invoking these treaties as a source of
rights. 92 The legislation narrows the scope of the War Crimes Act,
by expressly decriminalizing acts as well as grave breaches that are
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89

Id. at §950v.
id.

90 Id. at Section 5(a).
91 Military Commissions Act, supra note 4, at Section 5(a).
92 Id. at Section 6(a).
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93
banned under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Before the enactment of the MCA, anyone responsible for any
Common Article 3 violation, including "cruel, humiliating or
degrading treatment of detainees", could be prosecuted under the
law.94 The MCA revises this portion of the War Crimes Act,
replacing the broad criminalization of Common Article 3
violations with a list of "grave breaches" of Common
Article 3,
95
which are specified and defined in the legislation.
The Supreme Court in Hamdan held that the Geneva Convention applied to all prisoners. 96 Therefore, since the War Crimes
Act of 1996 defined any breach of Geneva Convention as a War
Crime, this opened up the possibility for legal challenges for
anyone involved in the abuse of detainees.97 Because the MCA
applies retroactively to November 26, 1997, the perpetrators of
several categories of what were war crimes at the time they were
committed, can no longer be punished under U.S. law.98 This provision immunizes and gives amnesty to U.S. military and
intelligence officials from
who have previously employed abusive
99
interrogation techniques.
Finally, the most-criticized provision of the legislation bars
aliens held as enemy combatants from filing a writ of habeas
corpus to challenge the legality of their detention or to raise claims

9' Id. at Section 6(b). Article 3 requires humane treatment of detainees "in all
circumstances" and bans "cruel treatment and torture" or "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."
94 152 CONG. REC. H7522-H7561 (September 27, 2006).
95 Joanne Mariner, The CIA, the MCA, and Detainee Abuse, FINDLAW, Nov.
8,
2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20061108.html (last visited Jun. 22,
2007).
96 The Supreme Court dealt a severe blow to the Executive's arguments
by
holding that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 136, applies to the conflict between the United States and al
Qaeda and thus binds the United States in its treatment of alleged al Qaeda
detainees. Hamdanv. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96 (2006).
97
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of torture and other mistreatment. 00 This strips the U.S. courts of
jurisdiction to hear or consider habeas corpus appeals and because
of its retroactive applicability, more than 450 pending appeals filed
on behalf of Guantanamo detainees could result in being thrown
out of court. Furthermore, the provision covers all non-citizens,
including longtime legal residents of the United States, and it
applies regardless of location, even if it is within the U.S.' 0 ' Moreover, the prohibition applies even after detainees have been
released. 10 2 As a result, detainees who have been tortured or
otherwise mistreated are forever barred from going to10 3a U.S. court
to seek redress and to air what has happened to them.
B. The Suspension of Habeas
As a group of retired judges wrote to Congress, habeas
corpus "safeguards the most hallowed judicial role in our constitutional democracy, ensuring that no man is imprisoned unlawfully."' 1 4 Such a denial of the basic constitutional right is problematic when individuals cannot gain access to civilian courts and
are detained indefinitely no matter how erroneous, arbitrary, or
legally unsound their detention happens to be. In light of previous
case law, it is likely that if such a provision is challenged it will not
be upheld by the Supreme Court
Habeas was first addressed within the "war against terror"
context in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 10 5 Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor explained that Hamdi was entitled to have his habeas
petition heard in federal court and that imprisoning a person is the
'00 Military Commissions Act, supra note 4 at Section 7(e)(1)(e)(1). See John
Cerone, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the Relationship
between the InternationalLaw of Armed Conflict and US Law, 10 AM. SOCIETY
INT'L LAW 30 (Nov. 13, 2006).

'0' Military Commissions Act, supra note 4, at Section 7(c).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104

152 CONG. REC. SIO 354, 359 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen.

Feingold).
105 Hamdiv. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
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most basic form of deprivation of liberty.'0 6 Thus, the government
must provide American citizens detained as enemy combatants on
foreign soil with due process.' 07 However, Hamdi specifically dealt
with the detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant. The
question of whether alien enemy combatants are entitled to the
constitutional right of habeas corpus is not as clear.
Two habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo
detainees reached the Supreme Court in 2004.108 The families of
twelve individuals being held at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo filed
Al Odah v. United States, and relatives of Australian and British
detainees filed Rasul v. Bush. 109 The government moved to dismiss
both cases, contending that the federal courts lacked authority to0
hear habeas corpus petitions by those being held in Guantanamo. I
In March 2003 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
and ruled that no court in the country could hear the petitions
brought by the Guantanamo detainees.''
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and held that
those detained in Guantanamo do have access to the federal courts
via a writ of habeas corpus.11 2 However, the Court did not address3
what type of hearing must be afforded to those in Guantanamo.'
Instead, the court focused on the issue of whether a federal court
could hear the habeas corpus petitions. 1 4 However, before the
lower courts could render a decision Rasul was released from
Guantanamo to British authorities and freed completely shortly
after their arrival in England.
While the decision of the Supreme Court in Rasul seems to
allow for habeas corpus petitions by alien enemy combatants, the
106 Id. at

529-530.

107 id.
108
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(D.C. Cir. 2003).
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"0 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at

1136.
. Id. at 1141
1l2 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84.
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issue is that the Court failed to define what kind of proceedings
would satisfy the habeas requirement. For example, would the
narrow federal court review of administrative proceedings held at
Guantanamo be considered an adequate substitute for habeas? This
has yet to be seen. However, in light of the MCA, the government
is doing everything in its power to make sure that the courts do not
take up cases of Guantanamo detainees. "Immediately after President Bush signed the act into law Tuesday, the Justice Department
sent a letter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit asserting the new authorities and informing the
court that it no longer had jurisdiction over a combined habeas
case that had been under consideration since 2004.'15
III.

CONCLUSION

On November 2, 2006, lawyers representing detainees
petitioned the D.C. Circuit to declare the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus under the MCA as unconstitutional, arguing that the
U.S. constitution gives prisoners the right to challenge their detentions in civil court. The Bush administration had until November
13, 2006 to respond in the cases. However, the issue is expected to
reach the Supreme Court.
However, with the upcoming Presidential election, it has
yet to be seen whether a shift in power will persuade Congress to
strike down some of the MCA's worst provisions. Nonetheless
common sense would dictate that the law be repealed in its entirety. Democracy requires it.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have brought to light the
vulnerabilities of our nation. Like the rest of the world, the United
States is not immune from terrorism and its effects. However, as a
"beacon of democracy," our country sets an example of freedom.
While examples are set in the best of times, they are proven in the
worst of times. For the United States to move towards laws that
resemble totalitarian regimes is an uncomfortable reminder of how
115 Karen
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fear has led us to a point where the most fundamental constitutional protections are no longer so fundamental. George Orwell's
Animal Farm is reminiscent of how things always start out with the
best intentions, but if rights, liberties, and due process are withheld
from one person, the door is opened for it to be done to everyone.
"All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal
than others." ' 1 6 Are we comfortable with branding the detainees of
Guantanamo Bay less equal?
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